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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

THE NECESSITY OF PLEADING A TRAVERE.-In a recent West Vir-case,1 originating in a justice's court, the Supreme Court of

ginia
Appeals decided that it would not reverse the judgment of thecircuit court merely because an issue had not been made up on an
affirmative pleading. Almost in the same breath, in another case,
originating in the circuit court,2 an opposite conclusion was
reached. Each of these decisions is fortified by a long line of
fairly consistent local authorities. Is the distinction between the
rules of practice in the two different forums warranted? If so, is it
dictated by the practical demands of justice or is it based on technical principles of procedure?
It is a fundamental rule of common-law pleading that the parties
must arrive at an issue before a case is ready for trial. The record
must show a dispute-an issue. Something must be asserted on
one side and denied on the other, or there is nothing to try. This
principle has been exemplified in numerous Virginia and
West Virginia decisions. For instance, it is erroneous to
try a case when no plea to the declaration has been filed ;3 when
the plaintiff has filed no replication to an affirmative plea; 4 or
where the defendant has failed to rejoin to an affirmative replication.'

Such a trial is not only erroneous in its inception, but it

is held that the judgment growing out of it is reversible. Hence
the whole proceeding is abortive, and furnishes, rightly or wrongly,
an example of the "law's delay," which has come in for so much
lay criticism in recent years.
The fundamental and uniform reason given for reversing these
eases is the statement that there can not be a trial without an issue
joined on every material pleading in the case. The extent to which
the cases go in enforcing the dry letter of the rule is very well
illustrated in Ruffner v. Hi.' In this leading West Virginia
I Stallard v. St i~p, 112 S. E. 184 (W. Va. 1922).

" McCoy v. Price, 112 S. E. 186 (W. Va. 1922).
S Kerr v. Dixon, 2 Call 379 (Va. 1800) ; Taylor v. Huston, 2 H. & M. 161 (Va.
1808) ; Sydnor v. Burke, 4 Rand. 161 (Va. 1826); M'Mlllon v. Dobbins, 9 Leigh
422 (Va. 1838); Rowans v. Givens, 10 Gratt. 250 (Va. 1853); Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Gettle, 3 W. Va. 376 (1869) ; Gallatin's Heirs v. Haywood's Heirs, 4 W.
Va. .1 (1870) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Chgistle, 5 W. Va. 325 (1872) ; Williams
v. Knights,, 7 W. Va. 335 (1874) ; Marion Machine Works v. Craig, 18 W. Va.
559 (1881) ; Ruffner v. Hill, 21 W. Va. 152 (1882) ; Brown v. Cunningham, 23 W.
Va. 109 (1883); Stevens v. Friedman, 53 W. Va. 79, 44 S. E. 163 (1903); Good
-v. Town of Chester, 65 W. Va. 13, 63 S. U. 615 (1909).
4 A replication is necessary to a plea of justification in trespass (assault and
battery). Shires v. Boggess, 68 W. Va. 137, 69 S. B. 466 (1910) ; Stallard -v. Stepp,'
note 1 supra. A replication is necessary to a plea of the statute of limitations.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Faulkner. 4 W. Va. 181 (1870) ; Curry v. Mannington,
23 W. Va. 14 (1883) ; Bennett v. Jackson, 34 W. Va. 62, 11 S. E. 734 (1890);
Henry v. Ohio River R. Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 21 S. E. 863 (1895) ; Kinder v. Boomer
Also, see Locklridge vi. Carlisle.
Coal & C. Co., 82 W. Va. 32, 95 S. E. 580 (1918).
6 Rand. 20 (Va. 1827) ; Williams v. Knights, 7 W. Va. 335 (1874).
5 Wilkinson's Admr's. v. Bennett, 3 Munf. 314 (Va. 1812).
0 21 W. Va. 152 (1882).
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case-leading seemingly because of its unadulterated adherence
to orthodox principle-the bare letter of the rule seems to have
prevailed over all practical considerations. The case was one in
ejeetment. The defendant had entered no plea, and hence the,
record failed to show an issue. Nevertheless the jury was sworn
to try the issue joined, a plain indication that the parties intended
to try an issue, and evidence was introduced, to all intents and
purposes as if an issue had been joined. Notwithstanding the fact
that the statute allows only one plea-not guilty-in ejectment,
so that the law practically enters the plea for the defendant, the
judgment was reversed, on the ground that there could not be a
trial without an issue. Bearing in mind the application of the.
rule as made in Ruffner v. Hill and other cases coming before and
after that case, and considering the rigid self-sufficiency allotted
to it, it is difficult to conceive that it could have any consistent
exception. If the the record fails to show an issue, that would
seem to settle the matter. Hence when, in an earlier case,7 the
court says that failure to file rejoinders to special pleas of the
statute of limitation is cured by the statute of jeofails, it is believed
that the holding is inconsistent with Ruffner v. Hill and the great
weight of authority grouped around the latter case. Likewise,
when the court refused, in a later case,' to set aside a verdict at
the instance of a plaintiff who had failed to reply to a plea of the
statute of limitations, basing its refusal on the ground that the
plaintiff was attempting to take advantage of his own omission, it
is submitted that the holding is inconsistent. If, as emphasized
in numerous other decisions, lack of an issue expressed on the
record is alone sufficient to vitiate a judgment, what should it avail
to seek for the fault back of the omission? These two decisions,
contrary to the great weight of authority are a plain confession that
the court can try a ease in which all the issues are not made up
on the record. Moreover, in the Ruffner Case, a verdict for the
plaintiff was set aside at the instance of the defendant, although
the defendant was the party who had failed to plead. It has
already been noted that a more liberal rule of practice is recognized in cases originating before a justice of the peace, although
tried de novo in the circuit court. Likewise, the same liberality
prevails in proceedings by way of motion for judgment under
7 Huffman v. Alderson's Admr., 9 W. Va. 616, 633-5 (1876).
Renry v. Ohio River R. Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 21 S. E. 863 (1895).
H
State ex rel, Matheny v. County Court, 47 W. Va. 672, 678-9 (1900).
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chapter 121 of the Code, although such proceedings are a substitute for common-law actions and are started in the circuit court.,
It may be conceded that a trial court should not try a case in
any instance until issue has been joined on all the pleadings; or
rather, until the pleadings, in each series, if more than one series,
have ended in a traverse or traverses. 0 An important and practical function of an issue is to control and limit the introduction
of evidence. Parties may assume an imaginary issue, and so limit
the evidence without an issue of record, but it would not be expedient for the court to assume in advance that such would be
done. A carpenter may, without measuring, by chance saw his
board the proper length; but the fact that such may happen, or
has happened, should not excuse him from measuring, providing
the propriety of doing so occurs to him, or is called to his attention, at the proper time. However, it is believed that the situation is entirely different if a trial has taken place without the
court's attention having been called to the absence of an issue.
When the matter has been affirmed by a pleading and has not
been met by a subsequent pleading, and the case goes to trial, two
possible situations, among .others, may result: (1) The affirmative matter may be entirely ignored in the evidence; or (2) the
parties may introduce evidence as if the affirmative matter had
been traversed. The most usual instance is that where the delendant has pleaded the general issue and an additional special plea.
If the affirmative matter which lacks a traverse has been introduced by the plaintiff and has been ignored in the evidence, there
is no reason why the plaintiff should not have a judment by nil
dicit as to such matter, at any stage of the proceedings, leaving
the issue or issues joined to the jury. On the other hand, if the
affirmative matter lacking a traverse has been introduced by the
defendant, although ignored in the evidence, it is said that it is at
all times sufficient to defeat a recovery, and the plaintiff is nonsuited on the ground that he has failed to prosecute his case. The
effect of the rule is most frequently observed in the statement
that one good plea is sufficient to defeat a recovery. Such reasoning, beyond a doubt, is technically correct, but does it always
lead to practical justice? For instance, suppose that the defend* Collins -v. white Oak Fuel Co., 69 W. Va. 292, 71 S. E. 277 (1911).
BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE,

See

§100.

Not even in the liberal proceeding by motion will an issue be dispensed with
provided the lack of it is noticed before trial. See BunKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE,§100. citing Preston v. Salem Improvement Co., 91 Va. 583, 22 S. E. 486 (1895).
1 VA. LAW REG. 447. and note.
i
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ant has pleaded the statute of limitations, that the plaintiff has
failed to reply to it, and that the only evidence introduced goes
to the general issue, also pleaded. In such a case, would it be
unjust to assume that the defendant had abandoned his plea of
the statute of limitations? If he has abandoned it, why reverse a
judgment on account of it? If he did not abandon it, it is fair
to assume that he must have been conscious of it, before and at
the time of the trial. He must have known that he had a perfect
right at any time to have the action discontinued, provided the
plaintiff had continued in default after the court's attention had
been directed to the absence of a replication. Is it not encouraging
"sharp practice," if not fraud and deception, to permit a defendant to remain silent under such circumstances and later to take
advantage of the situation, when, for all that the court knows,
he may have had no evidence to support his affirmative plea?
Suppose that the defendant should say that he was not conscious of
his special plea during the trial; that he forgot to ask that the
plaintiff be nonsuited; that he forgot to introduce evidence to
sustain his plea. Should these suppositions make a different case?
It would seem not. Apparently, he would equally have forgotten
to sustain his burden of proof if his affirmative plea had been
traversed. It is said that it is the plaintiff's affirmative and
positive duty to file a replication in such a case, and that the defendant should be placed under no obligatoin to remind him of
such duty. This may be conceded. It is not urged that the
defendant should be required to exercise any supervision over the
prosecution of the plaintiff's case, but that he promptly take
advantage, if he elects to do so at all, of the failure to prosecute.
His plea, not replied to, will avail him just as much before as
after trial. There is nothing legitimate for him to wait for. Getting back to the original proposition, it may be conceded that one
good plea is sufficient to defeat a recovery, but there is no inconsistency nor injustice in requiring the defendant to indicate at each
appropriate stage of the procedure that he relies upon the plea.
Suppose, however, that, instead of ignoring the affirmative
pleading, the parties have permitted evidence to be introduced
and have submitted the ease to the jury as if a traverse had been
filed to the pleading. This has occurred frequently in West Virginia, especially in cases where the defendant has failed to plead to
the declaration or where the plaintiff has failed to reply to an
affirmative plea. It is perfiaps true that in all these instances
counsel and the trial court -treated the case at the trial as if a

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss2/7
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traverse had been filed to the last pleading in the series. That
lack of an issue on the record did not hamper the introduction of
evidence is plainly apparent. Otherwise, the court must inevitably have noticed the absence of an issue and halted the trial before
verdict. The fact is that there can be no doubt that, in most, if not
all, these instances, the missing issue was clearly defined and understood in the mind of everybody concerned in the trial, including
the court and the jury, and that the trial took place precisely as
if there had been an issue of record. In such cases, it is a substantial falsehood to say that there was no issue. The plain truth is
that there was an issue, although the record fails to show it. The
issue is plainly implied from the nature of the evidence and the
conduct of the parties and they should be estopped to deny it. It
can not be successfully maintained that the process of implication
would place an unwarranted burden upon the court. It will be
noted that in most instances where a traverse has been lacking
to a pleading coming after the declaration the matter set up in the
pleading is of such a simple nature that its evidentiary status
is comparatively simple, such as the statute of limitations, or a justification in assault and battery. Hence there can be little difficulty in surmising the assumed issue from the purport of the evidence. Certainly such a process would be less burdensome than
a new trial, which is the only alternative. Then, should a judgment
be reversed in such cases merely because an issue does not appear
on the record, although it does appear in the evidence and in the
conduct and intent of the litigants? Should the board be thrown
away when it is a perfect fit, merely because it was sawed by
chance? Why not mould an issue out of the evidence? Pleadings
are readily amended to fit the evidence. Why not supply them to
fit the evidence in such cases?
The writer is willing to risk the statement that no judgment
in a common-law action should be reversed for lack of a traverse
to a pleading when the parties at the trial either have ignored
the pleading or have submitted evidence as if the pleading had
been traversed, without any objection for lack of an issue. Such
dispensing with formality may not appeal to those who revere the
artistic phases of pleading, but it will satisfy those who believe in
bending the processes of the law to the accomplishment of plain
justice.
Perhaps the process of implication should be confined to
traverses, as above indicated. To extend the process so as to permit
pleading matter in avoidance to be implied from the evidence con-
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-ceivably could lead to surprise and intolerable confusion, and there
would not seem to be a very great need for such an extension.
Perhaps in all instances, a failure to make up an issue is due to
inadvertence on the part of one party, and usually on the part of
'both parties. In most cases the pleading inadvertently omitted is
-a traverse, presumably because a traverse, being more or less informal, may be more easily overlooked than a pleading by way
,of confession and avoidance.
As has already been noted, a judgment rendered in a circuit
-court on appeal from a justice of the peace, or a judgment ren,dered by the circuit court in a proceeding by motion under chapter 121 of the Code, will not be reversed merely because the record
,does not show an issue. No considerations of convenience would be
sufficient to tolerate the suggestion that the liberality permitted
in these instances does not serve the ends of justice. No supposed
-necessity for liberality in a forum where litigants lack technical
guidance could in any event sanction a practice which did not accomplish justice. The bare fact that the technical rule is disregardea in those instances where the court is not bound by the
formal shackles of the common law is alone suffidient proof of the
expediency of the more liberal rule of practice. No practical reason can be urged why the same considerations of justice and expediency would not equally apply in a common-law action. It should
be added that nobody has been more emphatic than the West Virginia Supreme Court itself in condemnation of the technical rule
which the common law has imposed upon it. In Collins v. White
Oak Fuel Co.,11 Poffenbarger, J., says:
"The old common law rule, making a plea and joinder of issue
essential to the trial of a ease is still adhered to by this Court,
in common law actions, but is always reluctantly applied, when
it appears that the parties have treated the issue as having
been made up and fully submitted their respective claims and
contentions to the jury. If it were possible, consistently, to
avoid reversals for such cause, the Court would cheerfully do so.
It looks upon the rule with great disfavor."
A more scathing condemnation will be found in Simpkins v.
White,"2 in the language of Brannon, J.:
"This is the dryest and most hurtful technicality, reversing
fair trials, delaying justice, and ruining parties from costs, and
u1 Collins v. White Oak Fuel Co., note 9 supra.
12 Simpkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125, 27 S. E. 361 (1897).
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almost rendering the administration of justice a mockery. It
is based only on the common law rule that there can be no issue
without a plea, and unless an issue is made, which the parties
alone can do, there can be no trial; but the parties have, in effect,
made an issue by going to trial as on an issue."
*What has been said in this note is not intended as a criticism
of the Supreme Court. The prevailing rule is so firmly based
on fundamental, though technical, principles of common-law
pleading, and has been followed so frequently in the earlier local
decisions, that the court may very well urge that it could not be consistently asked to remedy the evil by judicial decision. It would
seem that relief, if any, must come through legislative enactment.
As a suggestion in this direction, the following tentative draft of
a statute is offered. Although it should be found insufficient, it
may serve as a step toward something better.
No judgment shall be stayed or reversed nor verdict set aside
in any case because an issue has not been made up on matter alleged in any pleading, provided: first, that no evidence shall have
been offered pertaining to such matter; or second, that it shall
appear to the court that the only evidence offered pertaining to
such matter is such evidence as would have been pertinent and
material only upon the issue resulting if a traverse had been filed
to such pleading; unless, in either instance, objection shall have
been made because of the lack of such issue before the jury shall
have retired to consider their verdict. If no evidence shall have
been offered pertaining to such matter, and no objection shall
have been made as aforesaid, such pleading, if filed by the defendant, shall be treated as having been waived and abandoned;
but nothing herein shall impair or affect the right of the plaintiff at any time to have judgment by default or by nil dicit, when
the defendant has failed to plead. If evidence pertaining to
such matter shall have been admitted as aforesaid, and no objection shall have been made as aforesaid, it shall be assumed
that a traverse was pleaded to said pleading, -and the record
may be amended or supplemented so to show.
-L.
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